NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 15 | Number 2

Article 1

2-1-1937

The Law of Arrest in North Carolina
Albert Coates

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Albert Coates, The Law of Arrest in North Carolina, 15 N.C. L. Rev. 101 (1937).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol15/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE LAW OF ARREST IN NORTH CAROLINA
ALBERT COATES*

An arrest, said Justice Merrimon in Lawrence v. Buxton,' "is intended to serve and does serve the end of bringing the person . . .
within the custody and control of the law." A person is clearly brought
"within the custody and control of the law" where he is overcome with
physical force; where he submits at a touching on the shoulder to the
authority of the law; where he submits without even a touching after
the reading of a warrant in his presence, 2 where he submits on being
informed the officer has a warrant, without hearing it read or without
even seeing it,3 where he submits to the officer's authority even though
the officer has no warrant. 4 To arrest a person, therefore, it is not only
not necessary to bring him within the officer' hands, nor even within
the officer's grasp, provided "he is within the officer's control, with
power of actual seizure if necessary," as in Journey v. Sharpe,5 where
the officer was on horseback outside the yard fence and the person to
be arrested was on the porch of her dwelling. "There must be a
compulsory restraint," said Justice Gaston in Mead v. Young. 6 "But
what is meant by compulsory restraint? . . . Is it more or less than

submission to restraint without incurring the risque of personal violence
and insult by resistance?"
Interesting cases arise when the officer uses no force and the person to be arrested offers no resistance. It is not enough for the officer
to have a warrant with him, nor to make it known that he has a warrant with him, nor even to read the warrant to the person named therein;
he must intend to execute it. And so, where the officer told A he had
a warrant for him, suggested that A go with him and left without further action on A's refusal to go, the arrest was not complete. 7 On the
other hand it is not enough for the person to be arrested to believe the
officer has a warrant with him, nor to see it, nor to hear it read; he
must intend to submit. And so, where the officer told A he had a warrant for him and touched him on the shoulder, A asked to see the warrant and on examining it pointed out a flaw, and the officer left without
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
L102 N. C. 129, 131, 8 S. E. 774 (1889).
'Hadley v. Tinnin, 170 N. C. 84, 86 S. E. 1017 (1915) ; Stancil v. Underwood,
188 N. C. 475, 124 S. E. 845 (1924).
"Mead v. Young, 19 N. C. 521 (1837).
'Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C. 317, 54 S. E. 291 (1906).
'49 N. C. 166 (1856).
-19 N. C. 521, 523 (1837).
7
Lawrence v. Buxton, 102 N. C. 129, 8 S. E. 774 (1889).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
further action, the arrest was not complete. 8 "Where a transaction
takes its character from the intention of the parties," said Chief Justice
Nash in Journey v. Sharpe,8 * "this intent is a matter of fact to be submitted to the jury.... What is an arrest is a question of law. Whether
there has been an arrest, under particular circumstances, depending on
the intent, is a question of fact." There is evidence of intention to
arrest when the officer tells a person he has a warrant for him and asks
him if he submits ;9 where the officer informs a person he has a warrant for him and tells him to meet him at another place in a few
minutes, 10 or next morning," or two days later ;12 where the officer tells
a person he is arresting him and that he must get somebody to go on
his bond or go to jail. 13 There is evidence of intention to submit where
the person sought goes with the officer;14 where he does not go with
the officer but offers to give bond if bond is required, 1 or agrees to
attend trial when the case is called, 16 or agrees to meet the officer at
a later time and another place, 17 or puts up a cash bond to keep from
going with the officer.' s
The arresting power has steadily shifted through the centuries from
'Jones v. Jones, 35 N. C. 448 (1852).
849 N. C. 166, 168 (1856).
9
Mead v. Young, 19 N. C. 521 (1837).
"Jones v. Jones, 35 N. C. 448 (1852).
' Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C. 317, 54 S. E. 291 (1906).
'journey v. Sharpe, 49 N. C. 166 (1856).
' Stancil v. Underwood, 188 N. C. 475, 124 S. E. 845 (1924).
, Mead v. Young, 19 N. C. 521 (1837).
Hadley v. Tinnin, 170 N. C. 84, 86 S. E. 1017 (1915).
"8 Journey v. Sharpe, 49 N. C. 166 (1856).
" Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C. 317, 54 S. E. 291 (1906).
28 Stanell v. Underwood, 188 N. C. 475, 124 S. E. 845 (1924).
In Martin v.
Houck, 141 N. C. 317, 323, 324, 54 S. E. 291, 293 (1906) Justice Walker writes,
"There was abundant evidence to show that the plaintiff had been unduly restrained
of his liberty by Houck and the other defendants who were present and participated. In ordinary practice, words are sufficient to constitute an imprisonment,
if they impose a restraint upon the person, and the party is accordingly restrained;
for he is not obliged to incur the risk of personal violence and insult by resisting
until actual violence be used. This principle is reasonable in itself, and is fully
sustained by -the authorities. Nor does there seem that there should be any very
formal declaration of arrest. If the officer goes for the purpose of executing his
warrant, -has the party in his presence and power, if the party so understands it,
and in consequence thereof submits, and the officer, in the execution of the warrant, takes the party before a magistrate, or receives money or property in discharge of his person, it is in law an arrest, although he did not touch any part of
the body. It is not necessary to constitute false imprisonment that the person
restrained of his liberty should be -touched or actually arrested. If he is ordered
to do or not to do the thing, to move or not to move against his own free will,
if it is not left to his option to go or stay where he pleases, and force is offered
or there is reasonable ground to apprehend that coercive measures will be used if
he does not yield, the offense is complete upon his submission. A false imprisonment may be committed by words alone, or by acts alone, or by both, and by
merely operating on the will of the individual, or by personal violence, or both.
It is not necessary that the individual be confined within a prison or within walls,
or that he be assaulted. It may be committed by threats."
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days :when every man took the law in his own hands, to the days of
William the Conqueror and his sons when the law of the land called
on all men to combine in associations of ten and required each one to
produce his associates when charged with crime, to the days when "all
persons fifteen years of age and upwards" were sworn to follow fleeing
felons in the hue and cry, 19 to the beginnings of the full time police
and their growing responsibility for enforcing the law. This article
undertakes to outline for law enforcing officers in North Carolina (1)
the powers of police officers and private persons to arrest with and
without warrant for felonies and misdemeanors, (2) the force they
may use in making arrests when the accused person submits, resists,
flees, seeks to escape detention or avoid recapture and the extent to
which they may call on private citizens for assistance, (3) their right
of search and seizure incidental to arrest and otherwise.
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT FOR FELONY

"Every sheriff, coroner, constable, officer or police, or other officer," says the North Carolina statute, "entrusted with the care and
preservation of the public peace," shall arrest without warrant whenever he has reasonable ground to believe (1) "that any felony has been
committed," or (2) "that any dangerous wound has been given," (3)
that a particular person is guilty, and (4) "that such person may escape if not immediately arrested." 20 And every private person, says
the statute, may arrest without a warrant whenever a felony has been
committed in his presence and he knows or has reasonable ground to
believe a particular person is guilty. 21 "It is the duty of every sworn
See 1

STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 184,

(1883).
P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 1, §3; N. C.

CODE ANN.

(Michie,

et seq.
1935)

§4544. Statutory provisions for arrest without a warrant have undergone many
changes as to the crimes for which arrest might bi made. The early law, as set
out in the REVISED STATUTES of 1837, c. 35, §2 (citing 3 Edw. 1, c. 9) provided
that "whenever a felony shall be committed peace officers should pursue and arrest
the offender itpon information received by them." The REvIsED CODE of 1854, c.
35, §2, added after the word "felony," "or any crime, the punishment whereof for
the first or second offence is death, or any part of the punishment thereof is
whipping or standing in the pillory." The statute of 1868-69 specifies "felony or
larceny." The CODE of 1883, §1126 adds "Or that any dangerous, wound has been
given." The CONSOLIDATED STATUTES of 1919, §4544 omit the word "larceny."
'P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 1, §6; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§4543. In State v. Stancill, 128 N. C 606, 609, 38 S. E. 926, 928 (1901) the
court says: "A private citizen has the right to arrest a felon, whether he is present
when the felony is committed or not. When -he is not present, it devolves on
him to show that the felony, for which he arrested, had been committed." In
Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C. 317, 321, 54 S. E. 291, 293 (1906), the court says:
"We need not inquire whether the statute, in this respect, is exclusive of the common-law right of a person to arrest another who is suspected of having committed
a felony, and that question is not therefore decided."
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officer," said Justice Reade in State v. Bryant,2 2 "and the privilege of
every private person to prevent the commission of crime, and to arrest the felon when crime has been committed. '' 22 " The basic questions confronting public officer and private person are therefore: What
is a felony? What constitutes reasonable ground for believing a felony
has been committed?
What Is a Felony? At common law a felony was (1) any offence
punishable by death or (2) any offence "to which the old English law
attached the total forfeiture of lands or goods or both."'23 A crime
created by statute was a felony when expressly designated as such, or
impliedly so designated through the use of the word "feloniously" in
creating the crime, 2 4 or when the crime was made punishable by death. 25
26
All other crimes were misdemeanors.
This distinction between felonies and misdemeanors became more
and more arbitrary as statutes added to the list of felonies some crimes
less serious than misdemeanors, and to the list of misdemeanors some
crimes more serious than some felonies.2 7 In the effort to correct this
condition the North Carolina legislature in 1891 defined anew the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. "A felony," says the
North Carolina statute, "is a crime which is or may be punishable by
=65 N. C. 327, 328 (1871).

" In State v. Roane, 13 N. C. 58, 62 (1828) a citizen awakened at night by a
dog barking, got his gun, opened the door, saw the accused going from the kitchen
toward the gate, called to him, and when he did not answer, shot and killed him.
On affirming conviction for manslaughter the Court said: "When an individual
commits a homicide on the ground of making an arrest, he must show a felony
committed, if not by the person killed, at least by someone; and secondly that he
made known his object-that it was only to arrest, and that the [accused] refused
to submit, and that the killing was necessary to make the arrest."
1 BisHop CaRm. LAW (8th ed. 1923) §615.
State v. Hill, 91 N. C. 561 (1884).
"1 Bisrp CRim. LAw (8th ed. 1923) §615.
Prior to 1891, writes Justice Clark, "North Carolina followed the somewhat
arbitrary common law rule as to what crimes were felonies, and what were misdemeanors." State v. Mallett, 125 N. C. 718, 723, 34 S. E. 651, 652 (1899).
' Prior to 1868, misdemeanors were divided into two classes: "those which by
reason of their heinous nature, might be punished corporally; and those that could
not be so punished." The first class embraced many crimes that were "infamous
and done in secrecy and malice or with deceit and intent to defraud which were
punishable corporally, and after 1868 by imprisonment in the State's prison." The
statute of 1891, note 28, automatically changed this class of misdemeanors into felonies. "Among those as enumerated in the RM'vSED CODE (of 1854), ch. 34, were
accessories to felony (section 54) ; certain grades of arson (section 30) ; bribery of
jurors (section 34) ; mismarking cattle, larceny (section 57) ; concealing birth of
child (section 28) ; false pretense (section 67) ; forgeries (sections 64, 65, and 66) ;
certain larcenies (sections 31 and 32) ; receiving stolen goods (section 56), and
perjury (section 49)." State v. Lytle, 138 N. C. 738, 743, 51 S. E. 66, 68 (1905).
In 1871-72, violations of town ordinances were declared to be misdemeanors. P. L,
N. C. 1871-72, c. 195, §2; N. C. CoDE A N. (Michie, 1935) §4174. Prior to the
enactment of this statute, disobedience to a municipal ordinance was not a crime.
State v. Parker, 75 N. C. 249 (1876) ; School Directors v. Asheville, 137 N. C.
503, 509, 50 S. E. 279, 281 (1905).
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either death or imprisonment in the State's prison. Any other crime is
a misdemeanor." 2 8 And thus the law stands today.
Reasonable grounds of belief. In Neal v. Joyner29 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina considered the question of reasonable grounds
for believing a felony has been committed. A reported that someone
had broken in his house the night before and stolen a trunk containing eighty dollars. A later learned from the railroad section master
that some person had the night before signalled the engineer at a
crossing three miles from the place where the trunk was stolen, an
unusual place for stopping, and had got on the train with a trunk.
Thereupon A telegraphed the mayor of the town through which the
train was passing to arrest the suspect. The Court held these facts
did not constitute reasonable grounds of belief. "Except the coincidence in time no circumstance is shown to connect the plaintiff with
the criminal act, or to awaken a just suspicion of his being the guilty
party, nothing in his manner or conduct, nothing found in his possession but an article carried with them by all travelers going to a distant
point or for a considerable absence.... The arrest was procured upon

information wholly insufficient to warrant it, or reasonably to justify
the belief of the plaintiff's guilt." In Martin v. Houcka° A told the
officer that somebody else had told him that B had stolen shoes from a
burning store. B was seen wearing a pair of new shoes two weeks
after the fire. The court held this was not sufficient grounds for believing a larceny had been committed to go to the jury. In State v.
Fowler,3 ' officers, who knew that there had been an epidemic of house
breakings, and who were specially instructed by the chief of police "to
keep a careful watch for suspicious persons on the streets because of the
recent robberies," saw two men near the depot at four o'clock in the
morning, hailed them, and when they fled, pursued and arrested them.
The court declared that the officers were justified in making the arrest.
In State v. Blackwelder3 2 a private person asleep in his house at night
heard the creaking of his garage door in the back yard, went out on the
back porch and saw his garage door was open, fired his shot-gun,
P. L. N. C. 1891, c. 205; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4171. In 1884,
the court had rejected this classification in the absence of a statute. State v. Hill,
91 N. C. 561 (1884). Under this statute, even though a crime may be termed a
misdemeanor, the type of punishment is controlling, and if the crime may be punishable by imprisonment in the State's prison, it is a felony. For example, in the
REVISAL of 1905, §3615, perjury is termed a misdemeanor, but the punishment may
be imprisonment for as much as ten years in the county jail or State's prison,
and the crime is held to be a felony. State v. Hyman, 164 N. C. 411, 79 S. E. 284

(1913).

- 141 N. C. 317, 54 S. E. 291 (1906).
:89 N. C. 287, 290, 291 (1883).
State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90 S. E. 408 (1916).
182 N. C. 899, 109 S. E. 644 (1921); see Brockway v. Crawford, 48 N. C.
433 (1856).
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heard a car crank up and drive off down the road, followed it, and
found the accused's glove and a pair of bolt nippers near the place
where he overtook the accused. This was held reasonable ground for
believing that the accused had attempted to take the car.
In other jurisdictions, the following facts have been held to justify
an arrest for felony without a warrant: the officer knew that the governor had issued a proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of the felon;38 the officer had knowledge of an outstanding unexecuted warrant for the arrest of the felon ;34 the officer had received
a letter from a prosecuting attorney ;8the officer knew that a dangerous
wound had been given;36 an apparently credible fifteen year old boy
pointed out the person he thought had attempted to rob him ;a the
sheriff of one county received a telephone call from the sheriff of a
neighboring county, describing a stolen car;a8 an officer received a
telegram from an officer in another state stating that an indicted felon
had fled into second state;39 an officer, summoned to a burglarized
home, saw a man flee from the house, hide in the bushes, refusing to
come out on demand ;40 a fireman, seeing a light flashing on and off and
a hand moving in a dentist's office, called an officer and accompanied
him to the office where they met, emerging through the open door of the
office, a man who said he had come to see the dentist ;41 a person, possessing a horse answering the telegraphic description of a stolen horse,
gave evasive answers when questioned as to ownership and as to where
he had procured the horse.42
In other jurisdictions the following facts have been held not to
justify an arrest for felony without a warrant: a reward notice over
the signature of a private person in an unofficial publication of a foreign detective agency;43 an anonymous telephone call not supported
by other facts ;44 a telegram from a private person (officer acts at his
own peril) ;45 a telegram from a police officer of another state requestEanes v. State, 6 Humph. 53 (Tenn. 1845).
Smotherman v. State, 140 Ala. 168, 37 So. 376 (1904) ; Bourne v. Richardson,

133 Va. 441, 113 S.E. 893 (1922).

Eberhart v. Murphy, 110 Wash. 158, 194 Pac. 415 (1915).

SCom. v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 95 N. E. 868 (1911).

87

Grace v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369 (1919).
mColorado v. Hutchinson, 9 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 8th. 1925) ; (1926) 24 MIcir.
L. REv. 712.
' Simmons v. Van Dyke, 138 Ind. 380, 37 N. E. 973 (1894) ; Burton v. N. Y. C.
R. R., 147 App. Div. 557, 132 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1911)
,0
Murphey v. Murray, 74 Cal. App. 726, 241 Pac. 938 (1925).
4 Bird v. State, 154 Miss. 512,122 So. 529 (1929).
2
' Brish v. Carter, 98 Md. 445, 57 AtI. 210 (1904).

State v. Evans, 83 Mo. App. 301 (1900).

"People v. Guertins, 224 Mich. 8, 194 N. W. 561 (1923).

Jones v. Wilson, 119 La. 491, 44 So. 275 (1907).
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4
chants." 6
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. two swindling commission mer-

ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT FOR MISDEMEANOR

"A peace officer," said justice Rodman in State v. Belk, 47 "may
arrest without warrant . . . for [a misdemeanor amounting to] a
breach of the peace committed in his presence" and for other.misdemeanors when authorized by statute. "Every person," says the North
Carolina statute, 48 "present at any riot, rout, affray or other breach
of the peace, shall endeavour to suppress and prevent the same, and,
if necessary for that purpose, shall arrest the offenders." The basic
questions confronting public officer and private citizen are, therefore:
What is a "misdemeanour amounting to a breach of the peace ?" When
is it "committed in his presence ?" What are the "other misdemeanours"
for which officers may arrest without a warrant when authorized by
statute?
Breach of the Peace. Riots (unlawful assembly of three or more
people, intending mutually to assist one another against lawful authority, accompanied by acts of violence), 49 routs (meeting of three
or more persons to accomplish an unlawful ,act and taking steps towards carrying it out)G3 and affrays ("a fighting of two or more persons in a public place ....

or publicly riding or going armed offensively

to the terror and alarm of peaceful citizens") 5 1 are referred to in
the statute as breaches of the peace for which an officer may arrest
without a warrant when committed in his presence. "Other breaches
of the peace," for which an officer may arrest without a warrant include such offenses as: assault and battery,5 2 forcible entry and detaminer if accompanied by violence or threat of violence, 53 "driving or
' Cunningham v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160 (1893). See Wilgus, Arrests Without a
Warrant 22 MIcH. L. Rrv. 695-698 (1924).
'"76 N. C. 10, 13 (1877).
P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 1, §1; N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1935)
§4542.
State v. Hoffman, 199 N. C. 328, 154 S. E. 314 (1930) (crowd armed with
sticks, knives and rocks, yelling and cursing officers who were attempting to replace
furniture in a mill house from which strikers had removed it, assembled to prevent furniture from being moved, threw rocks at driver of furniture wagon, and
beat mules; held to be a riot). Justice Daniel, in State v. Stalcup, 23 N. C. 30
at 31 (1840), defines a riot as "a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three
persons or more assembled together of their own authority with an intent to
mutually assist one against all who shall oppose them, and afterwfrds putting the
design into execution in a terrific and violent manner, whether the object in question be lawful or otherwise."
I 1 BIsHOP, CRIm. LAW (8th ed. 1923) §534(3). A suggested illustration is
when three men meet together, to lynch or tar and feather a certain person, and
start out after him.

CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES (3rd ed. 1927) §424.

"' Battle, J., in State v. Woody, 47 N. C. 335, 337 (1855).
'State v. McAfee, 107 N. C. 812, 12 S. E. 435 (1890).
" State v. Davenport, 156 N. C. 596, 72 S. E. 7 (1911).

t
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riding through a courthouse or crowded street ... so as to endanger
the safety of inhabitants," 54 and other "violent and disorderly acts and
threats." 5.
Officers have also been held justified in arresting without a warrant
for public nuisances committed in their presence, even though the public nuisance did not amount to a breach of the peace: public drunkenness,
as in State v. Freeman5 6 where the person "was found lying helplessly
intoxicated upon the sidewalk near the post office, a place much frequented, opposing an obstruction to all persons passing and repassing," as in State v. McNinch5 7 where a person was lying apparently
drunk and asleep in the yard behind a bar room with a hotel on one side
and a boarding house on the other -with some of the windows of each
overlooking the yard;58 driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor as in State v. Loftin; 59 indecent exposure of the person in public
places as in State v. Freeman,6 ° or indecent exhibitions of shows begun
or about to begin as in Brewer v. Wynne; 6 ' obscene pictures and "like
offences against decency and morality."
" State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288 (1874).
' State v. McAfee, 107 N. C. 812, 12 S. E. 435 (1890).

W86 N. C 683 (1882).

- 87 N. C. 567 (1882). In this case, two officers arrested a man for being drunk
and asleep in the yard behind a bar-room; windows of a hotel and of a boarding house overlooked the yard. The officers were prosecuted for assault and
false imprisonment. Justice Ashe on page 569 writes, "The [officers] justified
their act of arresting the prosecutor under the common law and an ordinance of
the city of Charlotte. His Honor charged the jury that the guilt of the [officers]
dcpended upon the question whether the place where the prosecutor was arrested
was a public place, and that if in order to view or see the prosecutor it was necessary for the citizens to go to the windows, then it would not be a public place.
The charge is erroneous. His Honor in making it seems to have had in his mind
the crime of nuisance at common law, but the ordinance of the city was evidently
intended to create different offences from that. It was a police regulation,
adopted not merely to secure -the citizens of the city against annoyance, but to
prevent the evil example of such immoral conduct.
"The ordinance embraces two offences, loud and profane swearing and public
drunkenness. To make these criminal offences it is not necessary they should
be committed in a public place. There is nothing in the ordinance about a 'public
place.'
"His Honor did not seem to consider the difference between public drunkenness and drunkenness in a public place. If, for instance, the prosecutor had remained in Sneider's bar-room and had been seen there by several persons and was
in full view of the dining-room of the hotel, only about eight steps distant, and
the windows of a boarding-house on the opposite side of the small square while
the guests were at dinndr, and indulged in loud and profane swearing, it was a
viclation of the ordinance, and, according to its provisions, a misdemeanor, and
the [officers] were justified by it in making the arrest." See also State v. MeNinch, 90 N. C. 695 (1884).
03In State v. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796, 803, 11 S.E. 366, 369 (1890), Justice Avery
says that the court in State v.McJincl "went to -the extreme limit in sustaining
the right to declare any act a nuisance that 'was not a nuisance at common law."
186 N. C. 205, 119,S. E. 209 (1923).
o86 N. C. 683 (1882).
163 N. C. 319, 79 S.E. 629 (1913).
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2

Committed in his presence. In State v. McAfee ai officer was
informed in the night time that the accused was beating his wife and
about to kill her. He went out into the road and heard persons talking
in a loud tone in the darkness and as they came within forty feet,
heard a blow given as with a stick, and a .woman screamed. A few
minutes thereafter the accused and his wife came along, the accused
with a stick in his hand and cursing violently, his wife crying loudly.
An officer is "unquestionably authorized to arrest without warrant one
who commits ... a breach of the peace in his presence," said Justice
Avery. "If the [accused] struck his wife with the stick described
by the witness at a point so near to the officer that he could distinctly
hear what was said and the sound made by the blow, itwould be considered in law a breach of the peace in his presence, though he could
not at the time actually see the [accused] because it was too dark....
The reason of the law is as fully met as if he had acquired the information through his sense of sight." And this decision was followed
in State v. Blackwelder6 3 where the creaking of the garage door in the
night time, heard by the owner in the house, was considered evidence of
an attempt to steal a car in his presence.
In other jurisdictions the crime was committed in the officer's presence when he saw: the flash of a pistol at a distance in the dark, if the
circumstances were such that the officer could have seen the occurrence
if ithad been light;64 liquor in the possession of another person ;65
a bottle of whisky in a person's pocket ;66 a person operating a whisky
still" ;67 when he heard in a house at night quarreling, amounting to a
breach of the peace ;68 swearing and cursing inside a house, indicating
a disturbance;69 screams from an upstairs room, where on investigation, it was discovered a man had been beating a woman although the
beating stopped just before the officer entered ;70 guns fired on Sunday
(as violating Sunday laws) although the officer could not see the offenders ;71 shots fired and on rushing to the scene of the shooting found
the offender, with evidences of the crime on him, or running away as
if in apparent flight ;72 when he smelled odor of mash, and on investigation found a still;73 opium fumes emanating from building, and, on
107 N. C.812, 816, 817, 12 S. E. 382 (1890).

182 N. C. 899, 109 S. E. 644 (1921).

People v. Barty, 53 Mich. 493, 19 N. W. 161 (1884).
Smuk v. People, 72 Colo. 97, 209 Pac. 636 (1922).
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 699, 249 S.W. 1010 (1923).
Martin v. State, 48 S. W. (2d) 1118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932).

State v. Peters, 242 S. W. 894 (Mo. 1922).
Stoehr v. Payne, 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206 (1913).
"Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S.E. 613 (1893)

; Dilger v. Commonwealth,

88 Ky.550, 11 S.W. 651 (1889).

516, 99 N. E.698 (1912).
People v.Barkas,255 Ill.
Piedmont Hotel Co. v.Henderson,9 Ga.App. 672, 72 S.E.51, 55 (1911).
" Kelley v. United States, 61 F. (2d) 843 (C.C. A. 8th, 1932).
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investigation, found a person inside smoking opium. 7 4 When officers by means of a mechanical instrument, a "direction finder," were
able to detect and track down a radio transmitter being illegally operated in a certain building, it was held that, because of the officer's
perception of the crime through the mechanical instrument, the crime
1 5
was being committed in his presence.
In other jurisdictions, the following facts did not constitute crimes
committed in the officer's presence: person cursing in policeman's hearing but not heard by policeman;76 officer, who hears "whooping and
hollering" around corner of street, finding two men, not creating
any disturbance, one of whom tells the officer the other had been making the noise;77 officers within seeing and hearing distance of shootings,
which amounted to a breach of the peace, but not actually seeing or hearing the shooting;78 hearing sounds of stealing corn, while watching
9
for thief, but not seeing who was committing theft.7
Authority to arrest even for a misdemeanor amounting to a breach
of peace committed in the officer's presence appears to be limited to the
duration of the emergency: to keep it from starting, to stop it after
it starts, to keep it from starting again. The statutes authorizing public officers and private persons to arrest in these cases, said Chief Justice
C'errimon in State v. Campbell,80 limit the arresting power to "offences
actually being perpetrated-going on to completion, or when they are
imminent-about to be perpetrated." And so, there was no authority
to arrest a person who had been in an affray, had his wounds dressed
and was some hours later walking peaceably down the road. But in
State v. McClure,81 it was held that an officer had not lost his right to
arrest the accused when he had walked fifty or seventy-five yards away
after committing an assault on the officer.
In other jurisdictions it has been held that in order to justify an
arrest without a warrant to prevent a breach of the peace, the facts
must be such as would lead an officer reasonably to believe an arrest
necessary to prevent an immediate breach, "as where a threat is made
82
coupled with some overt act in attempted execution" of the threat.
The right to arrest for a breach of the peace without a warrant must
"'United States v. Fisher, 38 F. (2d) 830 (D. C. Pa. 1930) ; (1931) 15 MINN.
L. Rav. 359.
"United States v. Harnish, 7 F. Supp. 305 (D. C. Me. 1934) ; (1925) 19 MINN.
L. Rav. 468.
"'Smith v. State, 10 Ga. App. 36, 72 S. E. 527 (1911).
" People v. Johnson, 86 Mich. 175, 48 N. W. 870 (1891).

'Brown v. Wallis, 100 Tex. 546, 101 S. W. 1068 (1906).
• Gray v. Earls, 298 Mo. 116, 250 S. W. 567 (1923) ; see Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (1924) 22 MicH. L. Ray. 678-683.
o 107 N. C. 948, 953, 12 S. E. 441, 442 (1890).
166 N. C. 321, 81 S. E. 458 (1914).
Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich. 576 (1879).
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be exercised immediately. "If the officer does not make the arrest when
the breach of the peace or other misdemeanor is being committed, but
goes away and returns after the entire transaction is over, with no dan83
ger of its renewal, he is too late to proceed without a warrant.
It has been held in other jurisdictions to be too late, if the officer de86
85
lays for several days,8 4 or for one day, or for several hours.
Statutory extensions of arresting power. Special laws have from
time to time extended the power of police in certain cities and towns to
arrest without a warrant:87 when any town ordinance is violated in
the view of the officer, even when it does not amount to a breach of
the peace ;88 when any ordinance violator endeavors to escape from the
corporate limits ;89 when any ordinance violation is committed in the
night time;90 when any state law is violated in the presence of the officer;91 when the officer has sufficient reason to suspect that there is
gambling going on, or liquor being illegally sold, or prostitution being
engaged in at a particular house, (officer may enter and arrest without a warrant) ;92 when any criminal offence is committed in the may93
or's jurisdiction.
Other special laws have conferred miscellaneous powers to arrest
without a warrant in specific cases: bank examiners may arrest without a warrant, even for past offences, any officer, agent, employee, director, stockholder or owner of any bank for violating state banking
laws ;94 forest wardens within state forests may arrest "on sight without warrant" for criminal law violations with reference to real estate
and forests ;9r the fisheries commissioner, the assistant commissioner
and inspectors may arrest without a warrant for violations of fisheries
laws in their presence;916 game wardens may arrest for violations of
the game laws committed in their presence ;97 passenger train conductors
on trains and the railroad rights of way, and station agents in depots
may arrest for offences committed "intheir presence;98 special police
1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2nd ed. 1913) §183(6).
"Wiggins v. State, 14 Ga. App. 314, 80 S. E. 724 (1914).
'Eldridge v. Mitchell, 214 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 69 (1913).
'Wahl v. Walton, 30 Minn. 506, 16 N. W. 397 (1883).
Officers should consult local statutes for extensions of the arresting power in
particular cities and towns.
SPRIv. L. N. C. 1874-75, c. 164 (Statesville).
Ibid.
wPmiv. L. N. C. 1883, c. 153 (Troy).
Pirv. L. N. C. 1885, c. 23 (Lenoir).
Paiv. L. N. C. 1891, c. 307 (Winston).
PRiv. L. N. C. 1899, c. 174 (Kenansville).
P. L. N. C. 1921, c. 4, §76; 1931, c. 243, §5; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)

§223(e).

P. L. N. C. 1909, c. 89; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6131.
uP.L. N. C. 1915, c. 84, §6; 1917, c. 290, §2; 1935, c. 118; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) §1885.
P. L. N. C. 1927, c. 51, §21; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2141(x).
P. L. N. C. 1907, c. 470, §§3, 4; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3483.
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at the State hospitals, at the State school for the deaf and at Caswell
training school may arrest without a warrant for city ordinance or state
law violations committed in their presence on the institution's
grounds;99 any person may arrest an escaped convict;100 any person
may arrest without a warrant "upon reasonable information that the
accused stands charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment or ten years in the State's prison in the courts of another
01
State."
In 1917, statutes regulating motor vehicle equipment and the operation of motor vehicles on the highways, authorized any officer to arrest,
within the limits of his jurisdiction, "any person known personally to
any such officer, or upon the sworn information of a credible witness,
to have violated any of the" motor vehicle laws.' 0 2 In 1935, highway patrolmen -were further authorized to arrest anywhere in the
state without a warrant, "any person who in the presence of [the] officer is engaged in the violation of any" of the motor vehicle laws, "or
of laws with respect to the protection of the highways of the State."'10
ARREST WITH WARRANT

The practice of granting warrants for arrests came long after the
practice of arrests without warrants was under way. Sheriffs, constables and justices of the peace, says Stephen, were authorized to raise
the hue and cry after fleeing criminals. "If offenders were to be followed from township to township, the different constables of each being
required to join, a written authority from a known public officer like
a justice of the peace would be a great convenience. The phrase 'grant
a hue and cry' was apparently in common use in the seventeenth century for granting a warrant, but the granting of warrants was afterwards recognized by various statutes. '"lO0s
'P. L. N. C. 1899, c. 1, §55; 1901, c. 627; 1921, c. 207; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) §6181.
" P. L. N. C. 1925, c. 163; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7707(a); P. L.
N. C. 1933, c. 172, §21; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7748(q). In Statc v.
Staicill, 128 N. C. 606, 38 S. E. 926 (1901) the superintendent of a prison camp,

without warrant, in the effort to arrest a convict who had escaped from the prison

camp ten years before, shot and killed him and was convicted of manslaughter.
In affirming the conviction Chief Justice Furches said that the right existed to
arrest an escaped convict where the convict knew he was superintendent. But

here he did not know it and the superintendent had no more right to make the
arrest than any private citizen. The court said the superintendent was not a peace
officer in the meaning of the statute. Justices Cook and Clark dissented.
"IP. L. N. C. 1931, c. 124, §13; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4556(m).
See footnote 140, infra, for laws providing for issuance of warrants for the arrest
of fugitives from other states.
'P. L. N. C. 1917, c. 140, §22; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2600.
P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 324, §3; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3846(000).
See P. L. N. C. 1927, c. 122, §3; 1933, c. 214, §10; 1935, c. 324, §7; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) §2621(3).
1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRi INAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883)

190.
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Who my issue warrants. "The following persons respectively,"
says the North Carolina statute, "have power to issue process: ... the
chief justice and the associate justices of the supreme court, the judges
of the superior court, judges of criminal courts, presiding officers of
inferior courts, justices of the peace, mayors of cities, or other chief officers of incorporated towns."' x0" By judicial decision this statute
includes a mayor pro tem.10 5 To these have been added by special
statutes many other officers empowered to hear complaints and issue
warrants in various inferior courts: recorders, vice recorders, presid06
ing justices of the courts, clerks and deputy clerks of court.'
REQUISITES OF WARRANT

In writing. "The law requires a warrant in writing," said the Court
in Lutterloh v. PowellI 0 7 "that the officer may be directed precisely what
to do, that he may know how far he ought to go, and that he may produce it in his justification when questioned for what he has done
P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §1; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935)

§4522.

'State v. Thomas, 141 N. C. 791, 53 S. E. 522 (1906).
'The following persons are authorized to hear complaints in various inferior

courts:

(1) Municipal Recorders' Courts: clerk of the court. P L. N. C. 1919, c. 277;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1553. Recorder, P. L. N. C. 1919, c. 157; N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1549.
(2) County Recorders' Courts: clerk or deputy clerk of superior court, recorder, or any justice of the peace of the county. P. L. N. C. 1919, c. 277, §30;
1921, c. 110, §6; N. C. CDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1571.
(3) General County Courts: clerk of superior court (who is ex officio clerk of
General County Court), or any deputy clerk. P. L. N. C. 1923, C 216, §4; 1931, c.
233; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1608(j).
(4) Domestic Relations Court: There is no statutory provision referring specifically to issuance of process, but a statute indicates that the same persons who
would issue process in other courts having jurisdiction of the offenses of which the
domestic relations court is given jurisdiction, would be authorized to issue process
for this court, and hence hear complaints. P. L. N. C. 1929, c. 343, §6; N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1461(h).
(5) District County Courts: the several clerks of the superior court of the several counties of the district are, by statute, delegated the same duties as are set
forth in the Code, section 1608(j) (above) one of which is the issuance of process. P. L. N. C. 1931, c. 70; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935), §1608(dd).
(6) County Criminal Courts: any justice of the peace of the county or mayor
of any incorporated town. P. L. N. C. 1931, c. 89, §16; N. C. CODE. ANN. (Michie,
1935) §1608(16). Or, the "clerk of the county," P. L. N. C. 1931, c. 89, §12;
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1603(12).

There is also a provision that a warrant issuing from a recorder's court or other
court inferior to the superior court, except justices of the peace, may be signed
by the recorder, vice-recorder, or presiding justice of the court, or by the clerk
of the court or deputy clerk, if any. The inference is that any of these persons
would have authority to entertain the complaint. P. L. N. C. 1919, c. 277, §12;
1919, c. 157; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1549.
There are many public-local laws and municipal ordinances relating to the issuance of process, and designating persons other than those listed above as authorized to hear complaints.
z2 N. C. 395, 396 (1796).
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under it.... For the benefit of the citizen, therefore, that he may at all
times be able to call upon the officer to produce his authority, and to
see precisely what it was, the law established the necessity of a written
warrant." Warrants may issue at any time.108
In the name of the State. A warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with crime issues in the name of the State. In Ellis v. Gee' 0 9
a warrant not issuing in the name of the State was held invalid, and
in State v. Petersi O where the warrant was headed "State and City of
Greensboro," the words "and City of Greensboro" were stricken out as
surplusage.
To designated officers. A warrant is issued to a designated personusually a regular officer but sometimes to a person specially deputized for
the purpose as in State v. Garrett."' A warrant was held invalid in Ellis
v. Gee for failure to designate a particular person to make the arrest.
To take named persons: "General warrants," says the Constitution
of North Carolina," i 2 "whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded . .. to seize any person or persons not named, whose offence
is not particularly described and supported by evidence are dangerous
to liberty and ought not to be granted." Pursuant to this constitutional
provision the North Carolina statute requires "a proper warrant" to
recite the accusation, name the person accused and command that he be
brought before a magistrate. 118
And Justice Hoke in Brewer v.
Wynne' 1 4 says: "Judicial warrants, general in terms and unsupported
by preliminary oath or sworn evidence and for conduct not committed
in the immediate presence of the magistrate, are not recognized in the
law of this country."
Under seal. "Though it seems recently to be thought sufficient by
some if the warrant be in writing and under the hand of the justice"
said Chief Justice Ruffin in Welch v. Scott,"15 "yet so many of the older
and most respectable authorities lay it down positively that a seal is
necessary to a warrant for a criminal charge that we are obliged to
consider it established law." This conclusion was affirmed in State v.
Worley"16 where Justice Nash said: "If there be no seal, the precept
is void and offers no protection to the officer attempting to execute it;
and if its execution is resisted by the defendant he is guilty of no offence against the law."
1C6

See N. C.

CoDE ANN. (Michie,

1935) §§4522-4527.

N. C.446 (1810).
-°107 N. C. 876, 12 S. E. 74 (1890).
'60 N. C. 144 (1863).
'ART. I, §15.
P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §3; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§4524.
4 163 N. C.319, 325, 79 S. E.
629, 631 (1913).
- 27 N. C.72, 75 (1844).
- 33 N. C. 242, 243 (1850).
L5
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The statute of 1868-69 provides that a magistrate may issue a warrant "with or without seal." 117 This represents the last stage in the
development of the law on this point.
Super visum or on oath. "A magistrate may grant a warrant super
visum," said Chief Justice Ruffin in Welch v. Scott. "But except in
that case it is his duty, before issuing a warrant to require evidence
1 8
on oath amounting to a direct charge or a strong suspicion of guilt."
9
And this was affirmed in State v. Bryson.1" While the testimony taken
by the magistrate must be on oath, it need not be in writing, "but it
would be safest for the magistrate in every case," said Justice Ashe in
State v. Bryson, "for the purpose of his own protection, to take and
preserve a written memorial of the evidence."
Contents of warrant. The North Carolina statute provides that
when a complaint of a criminal offence is made to a magistrate on
oath, he "shall issue a proper warrant reciting the accusation .... $120
"What we understand is meant by 'reciting the accusation,'" said Justice Ashe in State v. Bryson,' 20 "is not a verbatim recital of the
words of the affidavit or the evidence, but a plain, brief narrative of the
facts disclosed by the evidence, showing a violation of the criminal
law."
Warrants for arrest and warrants for -trial. The court draws a
distinction between warrants covering crimes for which the issuing
magistrate can only bind over and warrants covering crimes for which
the magistrate may try. In the first class of cases he needs only to
find probable cause of guilt; in the second class of cases he must find
guilty or not guilty. More particularity is therefore required in the
second class of warrants. And where the warrant charged "violation
of one of the ordinances of the town of Hendersonville" it was held
invalid for failure to "state facts and circumstances constituting the'
offence with such certainty that the defendant may be enabled to determine the species of the offence with which he is charged, in order
that he may be able to prepare his. defence, and that the court may be
in no doubt as to the judgment it should pronounce if the defendant be
convicted."'21
The officer was protected in State v. Jones12 2 in serving a warrant,
for the arrest of the accused for larceny, omitting the word "felonious"
and the allegation of ownership of the property charged to have been
"IP. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §3; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§4524.
127 N. C. 72, 76 (1844). See P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §2; N. C.
Com- AxN. (Michie, 1935) §4523.
- 84 N. C. 780, 782 (1881).
P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §3; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§4524.
-- 84 N. C.780, 782 (1881).
Hendersonville v. McMinn, 82 N. C. 533 (1880).
88 N. C.'672 (1883).
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stolen. These omissions would have been fatal defects in an indictment for trial but were not fatal in a warrant for arrest, and the accused had no right to resist. The officer was again protected in State
v. Guptonl23 in serving a warrant for the arrest of the accused for assault and battery, omitting the name of the person on whom the assault was made. This omission would have been fatal in an indictment for trial, but not in a warrant for arrest.
The officer may be protected in serving a warrant in some cases
2
where the magistrate is not protected in issuing it. In Welch v. Scott '
the warrant was not issued on the magistrate's own view or on oath.
"There is no doubt that ai innocent person arrested [on such a warrant]," said Chief Justice Ruffin, "would -have an action against the
magistrate. . . . But where the warrant purports to be for a matter
within the jurisdiction of the [magistrate] the officer is obliged to
execute it and of course must be justified by it. He cannot inquire
upon what evidence the judicial officer proceeded or whether he committed an error or irregularity in his decision." On this same theory,
an officer was convicted of a misdemeanor in failing to serve a war25
even though it was issued neither on view
rant in State v. Ferguson1
nor on oath. "No inquiry is admissible into the circumstances on which
[the warrant] was issued," said Chief Justice Smith in State v. Jamesl2 a
in protecting an officer serving a warrant based on a false affidavit.
But the officer is not protected in serving a warrant covering a crime
beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate issuing it as in State v. Mc2
Donald,1
7 where the officer was convicted of forcible trespass 'in serving such a warrant. "In issuing such a warrant," said Justice Daniel, "[the magistrate] exceeded his jurisdiction, therefore it was void;
.and the officer was bound to know it was void and would be no justification to him if he executed it. The officer is not bound to know whether
a warrant, which upon its face was professedly within the jurisdiction
of a [magistrate] had been issued regularly or not. But if from what
is stated on the face of the warrant it appears that the [magistrate]
has exceeded his jurisdiction, the officer is bound to know that such a
warrant is void and will be no justification for 'his acting under it;
and if he executes it he does so at his peril." The same rule applies
when the ordinance under which the officer arrests without a warrant
is later declared unconstitutional as in State v. Hunter. 2 8 "Policemen must determine at their peril," said Justice Avery, "preliminary
to proceeding without a warrant, whether a valid ordinance has been
- 27 N. C. 72, 76 (1844).
-166 N. _C. 257, 80 S. E. 989 (1914).
'-80N. C 371, 372 (1879).
""76 N. C. 197 (1877).
- 14 N. C. 469, 471 (1832).
n 106 N. C. 796, 802, 11 S. E.366, 369 (1890).
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violated." The court held likewise in Rhodes v. Collins 2 9 where the
130
warrant covered conduct which was not a crime.
Duty to show warrant or other authority on arrest. The officer
should make plain the authority on which he acts, whether he arrests
with or without -warrant. "If the officer be a known officer of the
district in which he is acting," said the Court in State v. Curtis,'3 ' "he
need not show his warrant when he makes the arrest; but if he is an
officer appointed for a special purpose, he ought to show his warrant
if demanded." In State v. Garrett'3 2 a citizen, deputized as a special
officer to arrest the accused, told him he had a warrant for him. The
accused asked to see it or hear it read but the officer refused, called
on the accused to submit and found it necessary to shoot him in order
to overcome his resistance to arrest. "One who is not a known officer," said Chief Justice Pearson, "ought to show his warrant, and read
it, if required, but it would seem that this duty is not so imperative
as that a neglect of it will make him a trespasser ab initio, where there
is proof that the party, subject to be arrested, had notice of the warrant, and was fully aware of its contents, and had made up his mind to
resist its execution at all hazards." In State v. Rollins' 33 the following charge was held correct: "He must, unless he is a known officer,
notify the person that he is an officer and has authority, and if he fails
to do so, especially upon demand, then the arrest is illegal and may
be lawfully resisted by the party or by third persons." This was affirmed in State v.Rogers:13 4 "The right to make an arrest without a
warrant imposes upon the officer the duty to make himself known as
such at the time."
In State v. Duda,13 5 a specially deputized officer with process in his
possession, failed to show his warrant, but merely announced he was
an officer. The accused was convicted of assault and battery with a
deadly weapon for advancing on the officer with an axe, because the
fact that the officer had previously served process on the defendant
was evidence that the defendant knew he was an officer. In State v.
Beal,'3 6 an officer who had left his warrant at home, one-half a mile
-198 N. C.23, 150 S.E. 492 (1929).
'The statutes provide: "Any city prosecuting attorney, any sheriff, police
officer, or constable, shall be removed from office by the judge of the superior
court upon charges made in writing, and hearing thereunder, for the following
cause: first, for willful or habitual neglect or refusal to perform the duties of
his office; second, for willful misconduct or maladministration in office; third, for
corruption; fourth, for extortion; fifth, upon conviction of a felony; sixth, for intoxication, or upon conviction of being intoxicated. P. L. N. C. 1919, c. 288; PUB.
Loc. 1913, c. 761, §20; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3208. For discussion of
this statute, see State v. Hamine, 180 N. C. 684, 104 S. E. 174 (1920).
- 60 N. C. 144, 150 (1863).
=2 N. C. 471 (1797).
113 N. C. 722, 18 S. E. 394 (1893).
166 N. C. 388, 389, 390, 81 S. E. 999, 1000 (1914).
100 N. C.423, 6 S. E. 89 (1888).
= 170 N. C. 764, 87 S. E. 416 (1915).
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away, arrested the accused, who knew him to be an officer and submitted. As the officer and accused walked along, the accused's brother
approached, demanded that the officer show his warrant, and on his
failure to do so, knocked him down with a rock. Since the accused had
no right to demand the warrant, the brother was in no better position,
and was guilty of assault and battery.
In State v. Kirby' 37 an officer had valid and invalid warrants in
his possession at the time he arrested the accused. He was indicted
for assault and battery and false imprisonment and convicted on a
charge by the trial judge that if the arrest was made on the valid
warrant the officer was justified and not if on the invalid warrant. On
appeal this was held error. "If a known officer," said Justice Gaston, "who has two warrants in his hands, the one legal and the other
illegal, declare at the time of the arrest that he makes the arrest by
virtue of the illegal warrant, that is not a false imprisonment, for the
lawfulness of the arrest does not depend on what he declares but on
the sufficiency of the authority which he then has." In Meeds v. Carver,' 38 where a deputy sheriff arrested the accused on an invalid process, he was held not liable for false imprisonment because there was
a valid process in the sheriff's hands which justified the deputy, although both the deputy and the accused were ignorant of the existence
of that process.
Fugitives from other states. The laws of 1868-69 provide that a
warrant shall be issued on satisfactory information that a fugitive,
or any other person, in this state, has committed in any other state an
offense punishable by death or by imprisonment for one year or more
in a state prison. The arrested person may be committed to jail for
six months, unless sooner demanded by the other state. If no demand is made within six months, the fugitive will be released.189
24 N. C. 201, 203 (1842).
30 N. C. 298 (1848). In State v. Elrod, 28 N. C. 250 (1846), an officer
indicted for seizing a mare which he claimed as his father's property, was held to
be not guilty because he also had an execution to levy. Justice Daniel at p. 251
said, "It is not what [the officer] declares, but the authority which he has, that
is his justification."
P.L. N. C. 1868-69, 178 sub c. 3, §34; 1895, c. 103; N. C.CODE ANN. (Michie,

1935) §4550. A similar statute was enacted in 1810, LAws N. C. 1810, c. 786,
§12 (Martin Compilation). Crimes for which a fugitive could be arrested under
this early statute included felonies and even misdemeanors punishable by whipping, branding or standing in the pillory. The statute of 1868-69, as well as the
earlier statute, was limited in application to "fugitives." A North Carolinian, going to Philadelphia, by false pretenses persuading a company to ship goods to
North Carolina, and returning to North Carolina before the goods were shipped,
was held to be a fugitive from Pennsylvania. In re Sultan, 115 N. C. 57, 20

S. E. 375 (1894) ; but in State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729 (1894), a per-

son standing in North Carolina and shooting a man in Tennessee was held not to

be a fugitive from Tennessee. The following year, the Legislature amended the
statute to cover such cases by adding after the word "fugitive" the phrase, "or
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Under the provisions of the extradition laws enacted in 1931,140 a
warrant will be issued on the sworn complaint "of any credible person ... or [on] complaint made..

.

setting forth on the affidavit of any

credible person in another state," that a crime has been committed in the
other state, that the accused has been charged with it, has fled from
that state, and is believed to have been found in this state.
FORCE USED IN ARREsT, DETENTION, RECAPTURE

An officer or private person may use all force necessary to make a
lawful arrest with or without warrant but no more. This topic will be
discussed in situations (1) where the accused submits, (2) where the
accused resists, (3) where the accused flees.
When the accused submits. When no force is necessary none may
be used. In State v. Belkl 4l an officer arrested the accused for a misdemeanor. The accused submitted without resistance. The officer,
having the accused in his custody and control, hit him over the head
with his billy. The accused thereupon gave the officer a violent shove
and was charged with assault on an officer. "If there is no attempt to
escape," said Justice Rodman, "and no forcible resistance, it is an excess of authority and a criminal offence which may be called an outrage
in the officer to inflict any blow or other violence upon his prisoner.
The prisoner is justified in using any force, not excessive, in defending himself from such unauthorized assault."
When the accused resists. An officer may use all the force necessary
to overcome resistance to a lawful arrest. In State v. Dunning 42 a
warrant was sworn out for the arrest of the accused for disorderly
conduct. The officer took the warrant, entered the store where the
accused was sitting by the stove, walked within ten feet of him and
said, "I have a warrant for you; consider yourself under arrest." The
accused got up with an open knife in his hand and said, "Damn you
and your warrant too; take your hand off of your gun." These salutations were repeated by both sides and the accused then advanced toward the officer a step or two with the open knife in his hand drawn
any other person." An arrest may not be made under this statute without a warrant, it was held in State v. Sheton, 79 N. C. 605 (1878) where several persons.
shooting an alleged fugitive they were attempting to arrest without a warrant,
were held guilty of assault and battery. Further provisions of this law provide
that the committing magistrate must notify the Governor of this State immediately on commitment, and he in turn is directed to notify the Governor of the
State (if the District of Columbia, the President) from which the fugitive is
supposed to have fled, P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub' c. 3, §§35. 36; N. C. CooE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4551, 4552.
"aP. L. N. C., c. 124, §12; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4556(1). For
arrest of fugitives from other states without a warrant in certain cases, see footnote 101, supra.
'76 N. C. 11, 14 (1877).
1,2177 N. C. 559, 563, 98 S. E. 530, 532 (1919).
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back for striking. The officer shot and wounded the accused and was
indicted for assault with a deadly weapon. There was an open door
behind the officer who could have retreated in safety if he had desired
to do so. On these facts the trial judge charged the jury that the officer was guilty. On appeal this was held incorrect. It was "both his
legal right and official duty," said Justice Hoke, "to proceed according to the exigency of his writ . . . and to use the force necessary to
overcome resistance to the extent of taking life if that is required."
This doctrine was first announced in North Carolina in State v. Garrett 143 where a person charged with a misdemeanor was killed while
resisting an officer's efforts to make a lawful arrest. There, as in State
v. Dunning, the officer could have retired in safety had he desired to
do so, and the trial judge charged the jury that the officer had no "authority ... to take away life by the use of a deadly weapon in order
to execute warrants" for a misdemeanor. And this was held to be
error. The trial judge "ought to have instructed the jury," said Chief
Justice Pearson, that as the [accused] had put himself in resistance to
the officer and his guard, they were not only authorized but were bound
to use such a degree of force as was necessary in order to execute the
warrants and were entitled to a verdict of acquittal on the ground that
the homicide was justifiable if no unnecessary violence had been used.
. . .The warrant must be executed peaceably if you can, forcibly if
you must." This doctrine was reaffirmed on similar facts in Slate v.
Homer144 and in State v. Durham1 45 where the accused was held guilty
of murder for killing an officer who was seeking under a lawful warrant to arrest him for a misdemeanor.
In State v. Pugh146 an officer without a warrant undertook to stop
a fight by taking the accused by the shoulder and telling him to consider himself under arrest. The accused "cast his eye" at the officer
but kept on fighting and was in the act of striking his adversary when
the officer hit him over the head with his billy. The officer was indicted for assault and battery and the trial judge charged that on these
facts he was guilty "because the [accused] offered no resistance to
the officer and there was no necessity for the blow." On appeal, the
Supreme Court held this charge was incorrect; that it was the duty of
the officer "to interfere and suppress the fight"; that refusal to stop
fighting at the officer's command and while the officer had hold of him
was "evidence of resistance to the officer and of the necessity to exercise further force to suppress further violence."
Where the accused flees. An officer may not shoot in order to arrest
a fleeing misdemeanant. He is guilty of an assault if he shoots and
144139 N. C.603, 52 S.E.136 (1905).
-60 N. C.149 (1863).
- 101 N. C.737, 7 S.E.757 (1888).
"141 N.C.741, 53 S.E.720 (1906).
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where the officer shot at a person flee-

ing from arrest for assault. He is guilty of assault and battery if he
shoots and hits, as in Nichols v. BradshaW148 where the officer shot a
person fleeing from arrest for operating a still. He is guilty of manslaughter at least if he shoots and kills and of murder if the killing is
intentional. A misdemeanant fleeing to avoid arrest is shielded, said
Justice Avery in State v.Sigrnan,1481 "by the merciful rule which forbids the risk of human life or the shedding of blood in order to bring to
justice one who is charged with so trivial an offence. .

.

. The law does

not justify killing one accused of a misdemeanor in order merely to
stop his flight, and we cannot concur in any view of the law that might
be construed to justify such careless handling of guns or pistols by
officers armed with criminal process merely because they can satisfy a
jury that at the moment of firing they did not intend to hit one fleeing
from arrest on a charge of misdemeanour."
Nor may one shoot a person fleeing from arrest for a minor felony,
as in State v. Bryant 149 where a private person shot the accused fleeing
from arrest for the theft of hogs. "The powers of arresting and the
means used must be enlarged or modified by the character of the felony,"
said Justice Reade. "Extreme measures which might be resorted to in
capital felonies would shock us if resorted to in inferior felonies. But
in any case where extreme measures are resorted to in making arrests,
it must appear that they were necessary and that the felon could not be
otherwise taken. It should be noted also that the cases where extreme
measures have been justified have usually been cases where the felon
has actually resisted. .

.

. There is nothing in the case to show even

a probability that if the felon escaped then, he could not be arrested at
some other time or place. So there was no necessity to kill; and if the
defendant had killed he would have been guilty of manslaughter at the
least."
The different standards of force permissible in overcoming the resistance and the flight of a fleeing criminal are explained by Justice
Reade in State v.Bryant;1409 "In case of resistance and conflict the
resistance must be overcome then and there, because not only is the
arrest of the felon involved, but the safety of him who is rightfully
making the arrest. But ordinarily there is not the same urgency in case
of flight, for, although he be not arrested then and there, yet he may
be arrested at another time and place. So it would seem that, at any
rate, there ought to be pursuit, or a certainty of escape, before killing
- 106 N. C.728, 11 S.E.520 (1890).
195 N. C.763, 143 S.E.469 (1928).
1-- 106 N. C.728, 732, 11 S.E. 520, 521 (1890).
"'65 N. C.327, 328, 329 (1871).
"' Id. at 329.
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could be justified; else how does it appear that he 'could not be otherwise arrested?'"
These different standards make it necessary to distinguish between
resistance and flight: In State v. Garrett,a citizen, deputized by the sheriff, went to arrest the accused for a misdemeanor, and notified him he
had warrants for his arrest, but the accused having his gun in his hands
refused to submit. The deputy decided that discretion was the better
part of valor and retreated, but returned next day with eighteen assistants. The accused came out to meet them with his gun, accompanied
by his wife with an axe, and his daughter with a butcher knife. The
accused began walking backward, gun in hand. His wife called out to
the deputy and his assistants, "Don't shoot," to which the deputy replied, "If he won't shoot, I won't." Guns were pointed several times
by both sides. As the accused, gun still in hand but not pointed, started
to get over a fence, the deputy shot and killed him. Was he resisting?if so, the officer might be justified. Was he fleeing?-if so, the officer
would not be justified. The fact that he had started to cross the fence
might be evidence that he had abandoned resistance and turned to flight,
or it might be evidence that he planned to renew resistance from cover
and to make a running flight, in which case, said the Court,149b "The
officer and his men were not bound to risk their lives by rushing on a
desperate man, who still kept his gun in his hands." It was for the
jury to decide. Similar situations existed in State v. Homer'60 and in
State v. Durham'51 with similar results.
Detention and recapture. How much force may the officer use to
keep the accused in custody after he has caught him? In State v. Stalcup'5 2 the officer after the arrest tied the accused in order to prevent his
escape, and in State v. Signzan'5 3 the officer handcuffed him, and in
both cases was indicted for assault and in both cases acquitted. "In
the precautionary measures of securing a prisoner, who had shown
himself so swift and slippery, by the use of handcuffs," said Justice
Avery in State v. Sigman,15a "[the officer] did not so abuse his power,
according to the evidence, as to subject himself to indictment for assault." And the Court went further in declaring: "After an accused
person has been arrested, an officer is justified in using the amount of
force necessary to detain him in custody, and he may kill his prisoner
to prevent his escape, provided it becomes necessary, whether he be
charged with a felony or a misdemeanor." The officer, therefore, can
1b 60 N. C. 149, 150 (1863).
139 N. C.603, 52 S.E.136 (1905).
= 141 N. C. 741, 53 S. E. 720 (1906).
= 24 'N. C. 50 (1841).
106 N. C. 728, 11 S. E. 520 (1890).
20,Id. at 731, 11 S. E. at 521.
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use as much force to keep the accused in custody as he could use to
overcome resistance to arrest.
"But when a prisoner charged with a misdemeanor has already
escaped," said the Court, "the officer cannot lawfully use any means
to recapture that he would not have been justified in employing in
making the first arrest; and if in the pursuit he intentionally killed the
accused, it is murder; and if it appear that death was not intended the
offence will be manslaughter." The officer, therefore, can use as much
force to recapture an escaped prisoner as he could use to catch him in
the first place.
The different standards of force the officer may use for detention
and for recapture make it important therefore to determine the point
at which detention leaves off and recapture begins. In other words,
when has the prisoner escaped? As soon as he shakes loose from the
officer's grasp and starts to run? or when he is disappearing in the
bushes at the edge of a clearing? or when he is crossing the city limits
where the officer's authority ends, as in Sossarnan v. Cruze?'54 Here
again the jury must decide.
Who determines whether the force used in arrest, detention and
recapturewas necessary or unnecessary? The short answer to this question is: the officer determines whether it is; the jury determines whether
it was. When the race is on, the officer cannot quit to consult a lawyer or impanel a jury. He must make up his mind in the moment at
his peril, subject to approval at a later time. The law laid down to
guide the jury on these questions has shown increasing strictness
with the years. In State v. Stalcup1541 the Court said, "Of the propriety and necessity of adopting this mode (tying) of securing the
prisoner, the officer is judge and the jury cannot supervise the correctness of his judgment." In State v. McNinch' 55 where the officers
resorted to force to overcome the accused's resistance to arrest and
efforts to escape, the Court recognized the difference between judgment
of the officer in the heat of the struggle and the judgment of twelve
men in the quiet of the jury room, and reversed a judgment against the
officers for the use of excessive force. The error in the charge of the
trial judge, said Chief Justice Smith, is that "it transfers the honest
exercise of the judgment of the accused, as to the degree of force
required to overcome resistance and the means appropriate and adequate to secure submission, under the attending circumstances, to
the cooler judgment of the jurors taking a retrospective view of the
occurrence. It moreover ignores the question of the good faith in
which the accused aver they acted in enforcing the ordinance and pre133 N. C. 470, 45 S. E. 757 (1903).
"24 N. C. 50, 52 (1841).

- 90 N. C.695, 698 (1884).
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serving public order and quiet .... The amount of force and the employment of the usual means in making the arrest and detention, when
within the compass of the usual means ordinarily resorted to for securing one found committing a criminal act, must be left to the discretion and judgment of the officer, when, actuated by no ill-will or
malevolent impulse, he is engaged in discharging a public and official
duty." This decision was slightly stricter on the officer than the
former. It left the necessary force to the officer's judgment unless
he was actuated by ill will or malice and left the question of his ill will
or malice to the jury.
State v. BlandS 6 further tightened the lines on the officer. Here
he had arrested the accused for drinking and disorderly conduct in his
presence, had killed a person who had tried to rescue the accused and
was convicted of manslaughter. The supreme court disapproved counsel's contention that the officer was "the sole judge of the propriety
and necessity of carrying [the accused] to the place of confinement and
of the necessity of using force to prevent his rescue and of the extent
to which it was necessary." The jury are to "judge of the reasonableness" of the officer's action, said Justice Davis, 15 ° ' in approving the
following charge of the lower court: "In order to enable the jury to form
a correct judgment whether [the officer] at the time was in such danger or not, they may, as far as possible from the testimony, place
themselves in [the officer's] situation, surrounded with the appearances of danger, if there were such appearances, with the same degree of knowledge of the deceased's probable purpose which [the officer] possessed, if he possessed such knowledge. ... If he could have
kept Brooks in custody and prevented deceased from rescuing him
without striking, it was his duty to do so. Were there by-standers?
If so, he had authority to call them to his aid, and if by doing so he
could have avoided striking the deceased, he should have done so,
and if he failed to do so, he was not justified in striking the deceased,
and it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty; but if the situation was such that he could not reasonably and conveniently procure
assistance, then he had a right to use such force as was necessary under the circumstances, to secure Brooks, and if in the due exercise of
that right he struck deceased, he was justified."
57
The law stands today where the court left it in State v. Pugh'
in 1888, where the officer was indicted for assault and battery for the
use of excessive force in making an arrest. There the court said,
"It was the duty of [the officer] to interfere and suppress the fight,
197 N. C. at 438, 2 S. E. 460 (1887).
I' Id. at 440, 2 S. E. at 462.
101 N. C. 737, 739, 740, 7 S.E. 757, 758 (1888).
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and if need be, he might, in good faith, strike a reasonable blow for
the purpose. While he had no authority to strike an unnecessary blow,
or one greatly in excess of what was necessary for the purpose, and
wanton, he was the judge of the force to be applied under the circumstances, and he would not be guilty of an assault and battery unless he arbitrarily and grossly abused the power confided to him, and
whether he did or not was an inquiry to be submitted to the jury, under proper instructions from the Court. A grossly unnecessary, excessive and wanton exercise of force would be evidence-strong evidence-of a wilful and malicious purpose, but the jury ought not to
weigh the conduct of the officer as against him in "gold scales"; the
presumption is he acted in good faith. This is the rule applicable in
such cases as the present one."
Breaking down doors. "All persons," says the North Carolina statute,' 58 "are authorized to break open and enter a house to prevent a
felony about to be committed." "It shall be lawful for any sheriff,
coroner, constable or police officer," says the statute, 159 "if a felony
or other infamous crime has been committed or a dangerous wound
has been given and there is reasonable ground to believe that the guilty
person is concealed in a house, admittance having been demanded and
denied, to break open the door and enter the house and arrest the person against whom there shall be such ground of belief." And in
State v. Mooring16 0 where the officer with a warrant for the arrest
of the accused, charged with assault and battery, summoned assistance,
proceeded to the house of the accused, demanded admittance and was
refused, broke down the door and entered, Justice Avery said: "It
seems to be well settled by the courts, both in this country and in
England, that where an officer comes armed with process founded on
a breach of the peace, he may, after demand of admittance for the purpose of making the arrest, and refusal of the occupant to open the
doors of a house, lawfully break them in order to effect an entrance and if he act in good faith in doing so, both he and his posse
conitatus will be protected." The fact that the person in the house
notified the officer the accused was not there was not in itself enough
to overcome "the presumption of law that the officer in the execution of
process was not moved by malice or other improper motive, but acted
in good faith with the intent and desire to discharge his duty to the
State ....

It is possible that the officer had good reason to believe that

the defendant bore such relation to the accused that he would be tempted
- P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 1, §4; N. C.
§4545.
P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 1, §5; N. C.
§4546.
O115 N. C. 709, 710, 20 S. E. 182 (1894).

CODE

ANN. (Michie, 1935)

CODE

ANN. (Michie, 1935)
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to aid him in evading arrest by telling a falsehood. The right to break
into houses in order to arrest criminals would be confined within very
narrow limits if their comrades could give them shelter in their houses
and by simply telling a falsehood take from officers in pursuit of them
the benefit of the presumption of law that ordinarily protects them."
That this doctrine extends to all cases of lawful arrests with or without
warrant and for even the smallest of misdemeanors is clearly implied
in the language of the courts and writers but has not been specifically
decided by the North Carolina Court. Perhaps it may be justified on
the grounds of overcoming resistance to arrest. The fleeing criminal
slamming the door of his home in the face of a pursuing officer may
well be considered to have interposed a barrier which the officer of the
law may lawfully overcome.
OFFICERS' POWER TO SUMMON ASSISTANCE
It is a long way from the day when the hue and cry called on every
citizen of "fifteen years and upwards" to follow a fleeing criminal to
the day when by-standers jeer at prohibition agents raiding speakeasies.
The intervening time has witnessed the responsibility for enforcing the
criminal law shift from the avocation of the rank and file of citizens to
the vocation of full time law enforcing officers in every town, township, county, state and federal governmental unit in the land, from
laws requiring everyone to have his quota of weapons in his home as
a measure of protection to himself and family against invading foes or
tyrannical overlord to laws prohibiting the possession of certain types
of firearms by the rank and file of people without a permit as a measure
of protection from organized gangs who would use these weapons to
prey upon society. But this does not mean the citizen's responsibility
for law enforcement has ended or that his participation in law enforcing
tasks has ceased. There are still cases where as in State v. Garrett the
officer was afraid to go and get his man and a citizen volunteered and
went and carried others with him. There are still cases where as in
State v. Dunning the officer called on citizens to help him take a desperado who had terrorized the neighborhood and they were afraid to
go. But through all the shifting circumstances in the preservation of
the peace, the law is still in the books waiting to be called into action
when the citizen wishes and when the officer calls. It is every citizen's
duty, says the statute, to prevent or suppress all riots, routs, affrays
and other breaches of the peace, committed in his presence, to interfere
to prevent the commission of any felony in his presence even to the
breaking down of doors if necessary and the arresting on the spot of
the violators of the law, and it is his right to summon "every sheriff,
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coroner, constable or officer of the police to assist in the arrest." The
citizens, too, are reserves on whom the officers may call in time of need
and who must answer to the call. When the citizen answers, the law
gives him the same protection it gives the officer, as in State v. James'61
and perhaps he may be protected when the officer is not, as in State v.
62

McMahon.1

Duty after arrest. "Every person arrested without warrant," says
the North Carolina statute, 68 "shall be either immediately taken before
some magistrate having jurisdiction to issue a warrant in the case, or
else committed to the county prison, and as soon as may be, taken before such magistrate, who, on proper proof, shall issue a warrant and
thereon proceed to act as may be required by law." "Holding that a
person may be arrested for drunkenness upon view, where it is a public
nuisance," said Justice Ashe in State v. Freeman,164 "the question occurs, what is the officer to do with the offender when he shall have
been arrested without a warrant? All the authorities agree that he
should be carried, as soon as conveniently may be, before some justice
of the peace. And if he is arrested at a time and under such circumstances as he cannot be carried immediately before a justice, the officer
may keep him in custody, commit him to jail or the lock-up, or even
tie him, according to the nature of the offence and the necessity of the
case .... While it is the duty of a peace officer when he apprehends an
offender, whether with a warrant or without one, upon view, as in this
case, to carry him at once before a justice or other tribunal having jurisdiction, the law is not unreasonable, and does not require that he should
do so at a late and unreasonable hour of the night, but should do so at
an early hour the next morning. That was done in this case. And we
are of the opinion the officer did what it was lawful for him to do
under the circumstances. The prosecutor was too much intoxicated to
be tried, and it was too late for a trial if he had been sober. He carried
him to the lock-up and made him as comfortable as the circumstances
would admit, and the next morning at seven o'clock carried him before
65
the magistrate." In State v. Parker'
an officer arrested a person intoxicated on the street, locked him up till he was sober, discharged him
withotit taking him before a magistrate. The officer was convicted of
assault and battery. The officer arrested and imprisoned the accused,
said Justice Bynum, "not for safekeeping until he could be tried before
a competent tribunal but he imprisoned him until he became sober, according to his judgment, and then released him. The [officer] thus
-80 N. C. 371 (1879).
-103 N. C. 379, 9 S. E. 489 (1889).
' P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178 sub c. 1, §7; N. C CoD. ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§4548.
a'86 N. C. 683, 685, 686 (1882).

" 75 N. C. 249, 250 (1876).
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constituted himself the judge, jury and executioner. This is the best
description of despotism." Likewise an officer was held for false imprisonment in State v. James' 66 where after a valid arrest, he put the
person in jail on a verbal order of the justice of the peace and kept him
locked up till next day. "If the justice for any cause was unable to
hear the case it does not appear that the [officer] attempted to carry
him before the next nearest justice in the county."
Detention for Investigation. Special laws have in numerous instances
specified the length of detention permissible before trial. Typical illustrations are: where the accused may be apprehended and confined in
jail for as "early trial as possible" ;167 or "if drunk or otherwise incapacitated," he may be confined until "in fit condition for trial" ;168 or
if arrested at night he may be confined till morning;1 9 or if arrested
°
on Sunday, he may be confined till Monday.17
In some jurisdictions, detention without a warrant has been held to
be unreasonable: when the accused was detained without a warrant
under a town by-law authorizing arrest and detention without a warrant
for forty-eight hours, because such a by-law was repugnant to general
laws requiring that an arrested person be taken before a magistrate as
soon as conveniently possible, and because no provisions were made for
further criminal proceedings to dispose of the case ;171 when the accused
was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of having committed larceny in another state and detained five days without being taken before
a magistrate, where there was nothing to prevent taking the prisoner
before a magistrate immediately;1.72 when prisoner was taken before a
police magistrate the day after his arrest and, charged with being a
suspicious character, was committed to jail for ten days (prisoner discharged on habeas corpus) ;173 when a man arrested on suspicion of
receiving stolen goods was confined more than five days without the
officers securing a warrant or giving him an opportunity to be heard ;174
when a man suspected of having purchased a stolen railroad ticket was
arrested, "booked" as a "suspicious character," imprisoned for an hour
and a half pending investigation, and then released (held, would not be
175
regarded as reasonable as a matter of law).
1 78 N. C. 455, 457 (1878).
PRiv. L.
Parv. L.
PRiv. L.
P iv. L.
utes.1

N.
N.
N.
N.

C. 1876-77, c. 117 (Winston).
C. 1887, c. 137 (Webster).
C. 1899, c. 307 (Sanford).
C. 1885, c. 127 (Waynesville).

Officers should consult local stat-

Burke v. Bell, 36 Me. 317 (1853).
Cochran v. Tober, 14 Minn. 385 (1869).
'Hill v. Smith, 107 Va. 848, 59 S. E. 475 (1907).
2
1 Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N. E. 506 (1900).
'Keefe v.Hart, 213 Mass. 476, 100 N. E. 558 (1913).
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
declares, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized." This amendment
was a limitation on the powers of the federal government, designed to
protect the people from "unreasonable searches and seizures ...

of their

persons, houses, papers and effects" by federal agents and applies neither
176
to state and local governments nor to state and local officers.
The fifteenth section of article one of the North Carolina Constitution declares: "General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may
be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the act
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense
is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous
to liberty and ought not to be granted." This provision is a limitation
on state and local officers.
Pursuant to this provision the North Carolina legislature has enacted
that "if any credible witness shall prove upon oath before any justice
of the peace, or mayor of any city, or chief magistrate of any incorporated town, that there is reasonable cause to suspect that any person has
in his possession, or on his premises any property stolen or ... counterfeit coin ... note, bill or bonds ... instrument . . . for the counterfeiting
of such coin . . . note, bill or bond . . . it shall be lawful for such jus-

tice, mayor or chief -magistrate of any incorporated town to grant a
warrant .

.

. to any proper officer, authorizing him to search for such

property, and to seize the same, and to arrest the person having [it]
in possession or on whose premises [it] may be found ...

and to bring

them before any magistrate of competent jurisdiction to be dealt with
according to law.'

77

"Such search warrant," says the statute, "shall describe the article
to be searched for with reasonable certainty, and by whom the complaint is made, and in whose possession the article to be searched for is
supposed to be; it shall be made returnable as other criminal process
is by law required to be, and the proceedings thereupon shall be as required in other cases of criminal complaint." 178 "Warrants to search for
stolen goods," said Justice Daniel in. State v. McDonald,1 79 are author='Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
1 P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §38; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935)

§4529.
'P. L. N. C. 1868-69, c. 178, sub c. 3, §39; N. C.
§4530.
17 14 N. C. 469, 470 (1832).

CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)
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ized by the principles of the common law.... A search warrant in this
State is to be granted only where larceny is charged to have been committed. It is not to be granted without oath made before a justice that
felony has been committed, and that the party complaining has probable
cause to suspect that the stolen goods are in such a place, and he should
show his reasons for the suspicion. The warrant then should be directed
to a constable or public officer, and not to a private person." This doctrine was affirmed in State v. Mann'8 0 where the home owner was
justified in resisting an officer with a search warrant for runaway
slaves, for which "the magistrate had no power to grant... a warrant.
The warrant, therefore, was null and void, and conferred on the officer
no power to act .... An officer has no power to execute a precept which
is not within the jurisdiction of the magistrate issuing it . . .and in
attempting to execute it ...he is a trespasser."
Laws of search and seizure have been extended by statutes to cover
intoxicating liquors. The present liquor search warrant law enacted in
1923 requires a "justice of the peace, recorder, mayor, or other officer
authorized by law to issue warrants ... upon the filing of a complaint
under oath by a reputable citizen or information furnished under oath
by an officer that he has reason to believe that any person has in his possession ... liquor for the purpose of sale . . . to issue a warrant...
commanding the officer to search the.., places specified ... and seize
all liquor, glasses, bottles, jugs, pumps, bars or other equipment used in
the business of selling intoxicating liquor . . .and keep [the goods
seized] subject to the order of the court." The information or complaint must describe: (1) the place or places to be searched with sufficient particularity to identify them, and (2) the liquor or other property
used in the business of illegal selling "as particularly as practicable, [but]
any description, however general, that will enable the officer .. . to
18 1
identify the property seized shall be deemed sufficient."'
The laws of 1923 authorized any officer who "shall discover any
person in the act of transporting ...intoxicating liquor ... in violation
of the law to .. . seize .. . the liquor ... and arrest any person in charge
thereof." They also authorized the officer "to search any automobile
or vehicle or baggage of any person without a search warrant duly issued
...where the officer sees or has absolute personal knowledge that there
-27 N. C. 45, 47, 48 (1844).
P. L. N. C., 1923, c. 1, §12; N. C.

CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3411(1).
By the laws of 1913, a search warrant for liquor conformed to the then-current

'

prohibition laws which permitted possession of limited quantities of liquor. The
complaint or information, furnishing the basis of the search warrant, was required
to allege possession "of more than one gallon of spirituous or vinous liquors or

more than five gallons of malt liquors." P. L. N. C. 1913, c. 44, §3; N. C. CODE

ANx. (Michie, 1935) §3380.
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is intoxicating liquor in such vehicle or baggage."' 1 2 The crucial questions for the officer are therefore: When does an officer "discover any
person in the act;" and when does he have "absolute personal knowledge?"
In State v. Campbell'8 3 officers knew the accused had a bad reputation for dealing in liquor and that he had been convicted and fined for
the illegal sale of liquor, and had information that he had liquor in his
possession when they arrested him walking on the street. At his request the officers did not search him but took him to the sheriff's office
where he voluntarily produced five pints of corn whiskey from his
pocket. The court held the arrest without a warrant was lawful and
that since the accused voluntarily produced the whiskey there was no
search. Such a search, however, would have been justified as incidental
to a lawful arrest.
In State v. Godette'84 officers heard the accused say he was going
to deliver a load of liquor the next night at nine o'clock. Officers on
the look-out saw the accused and a fleet of five cars stop in the heart of
town. As the officers came up two men jumped out of one car and ran.
The accused drove rapidly away but soon returned and was arrested.
One officer saw a few uncovered containers in one of the cars. Another
said the stuff in the containers smelled like whiskey. On arrest of the
accused and search of the car, the officers found the whiskey. The arrest and search were justified said the court.s 41 "The officer can arrest
(1) when he sees the liquor; (2) when he has absolute personal knowledge.... This absolute personal knowledge can be acquired through the
senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or touching."
In State v. Simmons s8 5 officers went to a house (on what information does not appear), and waited till the accused drove up and started
into the house with a grip in his hand. One of the officers followed the
accused into the house and the accused tried to escape from the rear.
The officers opened the grip and found eight quarts of liquid that smelled
like peach brandy. "The [accused] was not the owner of the house,"
said Chief Justice Clark, and "no question arises as to the validity of
the search warrant. The [accused] was simply caught in the act with
the goods upon him, and the officers under the authority of our statute
took the prisoner and the illegal goods before a magistrate and proceeded regularly."
"P. L. N. C. 1923, c. 1, §6; N. C. CODE
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§3398-3405.
'1

182 N.
188 N.
Id. at
183 N.

ANN.

C. 911, 110 S. E. 86 (1921).
C. 497, 125 S. E. 24 (1924).
503, 125 S. E. at 28.
C. 684, 686, 110 S. E. 591, 592 (1922).

(Michie, 1935) §341(f).

See
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In State v. Jenkins8o a private person informed an officer that the
accused was in the habit of bringing in liquor to sell, that he had got
some from him and that if the officer would be on the look-out he could
catch him. The officer saw the accused on the street with a suitcase
which seemed to be heavily loaded in his hand, stopped him, told him
he was under arrest and that he would have to see what was in his grip.
The accused started off, the officer started to take hold of the suit case
with his pistol in his hand, the accused struck him with the stick and the
officer fired. The accused dropped the suit case and ran and on opening it the officer found four gallon cans of whiskey. On the officer's
appeal from conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, Justice Clarkson said :186a "There can be no doubt, we think, under the decisions of
this Court that the [officer] had authority to arrest [the accused] when
he met him, coming along the road with a suitcase loaded as this suitcase was, particularly when his attention had been directed to [the
accused] as a man who was selling liquor in the camp ....
All he need
to show is satisfactory reasons for his belief that [the accused] was in
his presence breaking the law by transporting spirituous liquors." The
suit case, said the court, was not "baggage" protected by the statute
against search and seizure without a warrant.
In State v. Hickey 8s an officer was informed the accused was transporting liquor, saw him get out of a car and start in a building with
something under his arm, caught him and took liquor from under his
sweater. In upholding the conviction of the accused, Justice Clarkson
said: "In the case at bar the officer had information, which proved to
be correct, that the defendant was carrying on his person, concealed, a
quantity of liquor in violation of the provisions of the Consolidated
Statutes above quoted. The offence was continuing, and the sale had
not been consummated at the time the arrest was made. In many cases,
unless an arrest is made under these circumstances, the criminal would
escape or the crime be committed before the officer could make affidavit
and obtain a warrant. For instance, if the officers had information,
which was reliable, that one was carrying a concealed weapon, or was
on his way to commit an assault with it, surely it would be their duty
to arrest the offender though our statutes and our decisions require
that in such case they should at once take him before a judicial officer
and procure a warrant and institute a judicial investigation."
In none of the foregoing cases but State v. Jenkins was the officer's
right of arrest, search and seizure tested by a suit against the officer.
Perhaps their conclusions may be partly explained on the ground that
- 195 N. C. 747, 143 S. E. 538 (1928).
Il Id. at 749, 143 S. E. at 539.
198 N. C.45, 50, 150 S. E. 615, 617 (1929).
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North Carolina courts admit evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure to convict the accused and leave the accused to a suit against the
officer in vindication of his constitutional rights. What results might
have been reached in the foregoing cases if the officer's information had
not "proved to be correct" and the officer had been directly charged with
unlawful arrest, is not made clear by the court. But in State v. SimflofnSlB8s

the officers were convicted of manslaughter where they tried

to stop a car, occupied by two boys who had reputations for selling
liquor, in order to search it, fired at the tires when the car refused to
stop, killed one of the occupants and found no liquor in the car. "They
were acting solely upon suspicion," said Justice Connor, "which however well founded they thought it to be, appeared at the trial groundless." And in State v. DeHerrodora'8 8 the officers were held liable in
damages for assault and battery, when they were informed that the
accused would be at a street intersection at three o'clock in the morning
with a car full of milk cans containing liquor, when they found the
accused at the time and place appointed with the cans in his car, and
they fired at the car refusing to stop, burst its tire and wrecked it, but
found no liquor in the car. L8 9
The law against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply
to searches incidental to a lawful arrest as in State v. Fowler'9Owhere
the officers found and took from the persons of the prisoners a pistol,
pistol scabbards and chisel and were not required to return them before
the trial.
In other jurisdictions it has been held that a search and seizure without a warrant was justified, where officers upon going to accused's house
and knocking, saw defendant flee with a suitcase which he threw away
when the officers overtook him, and the officers found liquor in the suitcase;191 where officers hearing loud disturbance, and fighting and
threats to kill in a private house after .midnight, entered to quiet the
disturbance, and saw and seized several bottles of whiskey on a
table ;192- where an officer obtained, from an informant who claimed to
have bought liquor from the accused, information that a' certain person
-8 192 N. C. 692, 695, 135 S. E. 866, 867 (1926).
192 N. C. 749, 136 S. E. 6 (1926).
"For search warrants for deserting seamen, see P. L. N. C. 1881, c. 256, §3;
N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4473; in re game law violations, see2 P. L. N. C.
1927, c. 51 §§21, 22; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§2141(x), 141(y) ; for
seizure of property exhibited by gamblers, see N. C. CoDn ANN. (Michie, 1935)
§§4436, 4437; for seizure of narcotics, see P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 477; N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6686(1-28).
o172 N. C. 905, 90 S. E. 408 (1916).
12 Mabray v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 236, 256 S. W. 392 (1923).
'm People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922).
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was transporting intoxicating liquor, entered the accused's premises and
searched an automobile in which the accused was sitting.195
Search incidental to arrest. After an arrest is made an officer has a
right to search the arrested person.' 9 4 As expressed in Smith v.
State, 9 5 "It is well settled that an officer making an arrest has authority
to search the person and immediate place of arrest of his prisoner and
to take from him any dangerous weapons or anything that he may reasonably deem necessary to his own or the public safety, or to prevent
escape ... or which might be used as evidence against him . .. or
which he believes to be connected with the offence charged or that may
give a clue to the commission of the crime." Courts in other jurisdictions have decided many questions arising out of searches incidental to
arrests. The officer is not limited to a search of the person. If the arrest is made in a room, the officer may seize all incriminating objects
that are visible, 1906 and in some states it has been held permissible to make
an exploratory search of the room. 197 But the officer usually will not be
justified in searching other rooms, such as the upstairs rooms,' 9 8 or the
cellar.' 99 If the arrest is not made at the accused's residence, the officer is not authorized to go to the residence and search it after the arrest
200
is made.
Property which may be seized. The officer may seize property
which tends to incriminate the arrested person. Examples of property
held lawfully seized in other jurisdictions are: lottery tickets;201 revolvers found in accused's room when the charge was murder ;202 in204
criminating letters ;203 gambling paraphernalia.
The laws against unreasonable searches and seizures also do not
apply when such searches and seizures are made with the consent of the
person whose house is being searched, as in State v. Fowler, where the
officers with the consent of the owner searched the dwelling and took
newspaper clippings, mutilated coins and other property which they
thought would be useful in the case. "There could not be any objection
to the introduction in evidence of the articles found by the officers and
voluntarily given by the two women who had them in their possession.
u3People v. Bresler, 223 Mich. 610, 194 N. W. 559 (1923).
111 BisHop, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2nd ed. 1913) 210-212.
21552 Okla. Crim. 333, 4 P. (2d) 1076 (1931).
rePeople v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922).
21 People v. Cona, 180 Mich. 641, 147 N. W. 525 (1914).
'8People v. Conway, 225 Mich. 152, 195 N. W. 679 (1923).
"'People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922).
2°Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
m Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 284, 9 Pac. 173 (1885).
People v. Cona, 180 Mich. 641, 147 N. W. 525 (1914).
People v. Trine, 164 Mich. 1, 129 N. W. 3 (1910).
People v. Adams, 176 N. Y 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903).
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This was not an illegal search and seizure within the meaning of the
20 5
constitutional provision against them."
Conclusion. The history of arrests is part of the history of law and
order; it is also part of the history of liberty. The constitutional provisions, the legislative enactments, the judicial decisions carried on the
printed pages of North Carolina's law books are more than figments of
past imaginations. They are instinct with the meaning of Magna Carta,
guaranteeing that no free man should be imprisoned but by the law of
the land; of the Petition of Rights, guaranteeing that no free man should
be imprisoned or detained without cause shown to which he might make
answer according to law; of the Habeas Corpus act, guaranteeing to any
man restrained of his liberty by decree of any court or by command of
the King himself the right to be brought before the board to determine
whether his commitment be just; of the Bill of Rights, guaranteeing
against the evasion of the foregoing rights by providing that excessive
bail should not be required. They furnish the rules of the race between
the pursuing officer and the fleeing criminal.
Law enforcing officers in North Carolina today are the lineal heirs
of men who a thousand years ago took the law in their own hands and
when they caught a criminal "red handed," "backbearing," or "hand
having," killed him on the spot. They are also the heirs of men who
through the centuries have slowly knit the fabric of a law which guarantees to every arrested person the right to a hearing before a magistrate, a trial in open court before a jury of his peers, and judgment according to law. They must not forget that the hue and cry of a thousand
years ago may be the lynch law of today; that the officer too ready with
the billy and too quick on the trigger, and the citizen with the mob that
hangs the victim on the spot are in one instinctive moment blotting out
the slow and painful steps through which our race has slowly fought
and climbed its way from savage isolation to organic social life.
172 N. C. 905, 912, 90 S. E. 408, 411 (1916).

